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INTRODUCTION
In listening to the presentations that have been made by my
colleagues over the last two days, I am struck once again by the
virtually exclusive reference to and emphasis upon national sources
of law: the national Constitution; national statutes; national courts
and in particular the nine individuals who comprise the national
Supreme Court. Certainly, this is not happenstance or oversight. If,
as my colleague John White has asserted, modem Civil Rights law
was "born" forty-nine years ago with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' then it is also fair to say
that it was born, at least in part, out of a largely justified loss of faith
in state law processes as a primary guarantor of civil rights. For
those of us who have studied-and usually, by doing so, promoted
reliance on-state constitutional declarations of rights as primary
sources of protection of rights, this may well be our dirty little secret.
For the truth is, state constitutional rights guarantees proved, for
much of the near-century from the abolition of slavery until the
coming of Brown, largely incapable of protecting or promoting the
civil rights of African American or other marginalized groups in
society. As we all know, the battle cry of "states' rights" was and is
more frequently invoked in opposition to, rather than in favor of,
efforts to secure legal protection of civil rights. It remains rare for
those who passionately support the civil rights agenda to also believe
strongly in decentralization of the process of protection of civil rights
by law. It appears equally rare for those who speak loudly of the
need for states to return to their traditional role as primary protectors
of rights to also believe strongly that such an independent tradition
should emphasize real world protection of the interests of victims of
societal discrimination. And, certainly, at least some state courts
independently construing state constitutional or other sources of law
in the area of civil rights have exhibited what appears to be unseemly
glee in interpreting those state sources of law to make achievement
of the goals of Brown more, rather than less, difficult.' Thus, there
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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surely are reasons to believe that those who might be tempted to rely
on state law as a protector of civil rights would be casting their seed
on stony ground indeed.
And yet ....
The last twenty years have shown that exclusive reliance on
national law, national courts and the national Constitution to protect
civil rights is no guarantee of progress either. The same quality of
centralization that allowed progressive Justices to launch the civil
rights revolution half a century ago, also-as several preceding
speakers over the last two days have noted-allowed their successors
to gradually convert the federal Fourteenth Amendment from its
intended role as the basis of remedial civil rights legislation, into its
new role as an obstacle to real world assistance for victims of
structural unfairness in society.3 As the very premise of this
conference confirms, virtually exclusive reliance on federal law has
not, in the long run, served to preserve the vision of civil rights
protection that was birthed with such hope in Brown. It may well be
time to reconsider the merits of a more decentralized approach.4
1186 (La. 1996), discussed infra.
3. The transformation of federal law in this area has been remarkable. The
14th Amendment was originally enacted, in large part, to provide retroactive
constitutional justification for Congress' enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which certainly included class and race-specific efforts at improving the lot of the
newly freed slaves. The "vision" of civil rights that has been identified with Brown
certainly did not reject the idea that governmental efforts at overcoming the heritage
of discrimination might sometimes require programs targeted to the disadvantaged
group, even if that group was identified by race. More recent decisions, however,
have often operated to transform the 14th Amendment from an authorization for
into an obstacle to provision of targeted assistance to the disadvantaged by the
government. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), by
requiring proof of a specific discriminatory intent on the part of an identified bad
actor, largely precluded use of the 14th Amendment as a tool to attack the structural
bases of persistent inequality. City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469,
109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) and Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995), by interpreting the 14th Amendment to generally forbid not
invidious "discrimination" on the basis of race, but rather any "classification" on
the basis of race, appeared to treat race conscious efforts to reach out to or assist the
disadvantaged as constitutionally indistinguishable from race conscious efforts to
maintain or further racial inequality and subordination. There have recently been
signs of a limited movement back in other direction, however. In Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001), the Supreme Court upheld a
districting plan that took race into account, as one factor among many in drawing
Congressional district boundaries. In Grutter v. Bollinger, U.S. 123 S.Ct. 2325
(2003), decided after our conference was held, but while the written version of this
article was in preparation, the Court upheld certain limited forms of affirmative
action in the academic context.
4. The point may go even deeper. Progressives have, I think, often been
blinded by the historic, though temporary, legal triumph represented by Brown and
its immediate progeny. Perhaps in our hearts we keep yearning to recreate the
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Accordingly, this paper attempts to begin a process of
investigating whether state constitutions can serve as a source of
principles which can be used to further the civil rights of those who
are, to a greater or lesser degree, marginalized within our society. It
will focus on the state constitutional tradition I know best, that of
Louisiana. Unfortunately my conclusion will be that in Louisiana, at
least, the prospect for robust independent state constitution based
"voice" in civil rights is poor. There is little organic tradition of
constitutional protection of civil rights in this state. Those provisions
of the current Louisiana constitution which may have traction for this
purpose are largely derived from federal sources and, not
surprisingly, are unlikely to be interpreted in a manner that will
provide a philosophical alternative to federal analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Indeed, where the
state judiciary has most notably departed from federal analysis of
constitutional equality-in the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
in Louisiana Associated General Contractors v. State ("LA GC )5 -
it has done so in a way that mirrors and furthers certain basic
presuppositions of current federal law. Because of that flawed
analysis, the Louisiana Constitution, as interpreted inLAGC, not only
provides no truly independent contribution to debate over civil rights
but also, I am sorry to say, creates an additional obstacle to
achievement of real world equality for traditionally disfavored
groups.
In other states, however, the prospect may be brighter. The last
part of this presentation provides a very preliminary sketch of why
some other states may have a better opportunity to provide a viable
alternative to current federal analysis of constitutional equality and
its relation to the achievement of a more transformative vision of
civil rights. Some states do enjoy an indigenous tradition of
constitutional protection of human equality, one which developed and
combination of forces and personalities that led the national Supreme Court to take
the unusual step of becoming the standard bearer for progressive social change
through law. It was wonderful while it lasted. But the reality is that the law and
courts function far more often as protectors of the status quo than as forces for
progressive change. The U.S. Supreme Court has, throughout its history, been
more often dominated by the philosophies of a Taney, a Southerland, a Rehnquist,
or a Scalia than by those of a Cardozo, a Warren or a Brennan. Those who argue
for progressive change through law should, I think, bear in mind that they operate
in fundamentally hostile territory. Perhaps we should learn to think more like
guerillas, eschewing too much reliance on the single great national victory, in favor
of a strategy of pursuing local successes wherever the possibility of progress- be
it in the federal court or in state courts, through constitutional guarantees or through
other sources of law-may appear. In the effort to promote a more just society
through law, we cannot afford to ignore state constitutional or common law.
5. 669 So. 2d 1185 (La 1996). The case is discussed infra in notes 74-95.
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has been interpreted independently of the federal Fourteenth
Amendment. In these states, the prospect for a truly independent
state constitutional contribution to the debate remains alive.
PROLOGUE: ON THE MEANING OF "CIVIL RIGHTS" AND THE LAGC
DISASTER
I doubt that I am capable of defining what "civil rights" means,
whether in some broader sense or in the particular sense that is the
focus of this conference. However, I do feel confident in asserting
that one aspect of that concept is and must be that the law is
"purposive" with respect to the dignity and equality of citizens. Civil
rights law (like the law of constitutional equality) should not be a
mere system of formal rules divorced from social reality. Rather, I
believe, the concept of civil rights under law that underlies Brown
and its progeny includes an acceptance that one central purpose of
civil rights law is to transform society, to destroy a social system that
systematically subordinated certain groups of people and protected
the de facto superior status of other groups. It follows, I think, that
this notion of civil rights includes an acceptance that the law should
not always be "blind" to race or any other characteristic that reflects
or impacts on that system of subordination. According to this vision,
law should instead remain aware of continuing social inequalities,
and accept good faith race-conscious (as well as class-conscious,
immigrant-conscious, age-conscious, gender-conscious, or any other
relevant "conscious") efforts to undo those inequalities.6
If this is, indeed, what "civil rights" means, at least in part, then
the 1996 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Louisiana
Associated General Contractors v. State ("LAGC")' stands as a
strong and negative indication of the present utility of state
constitutional law regarding constitutional equality in relation to civil
rights.' In LAGC, discussed below, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the state constitution's guarantee of individual dignity,
section 3 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, absolutely prohibits
the state from making any distinctions between persons on the basis
of race and therefore precluded the state from establishing a set aside
6. It is this view of civil rights as transformative that is so directly opposed by
and opposed to the current view, shared by the national Supreme Court and its
Louisiana counterpart, that the essential principle of equal protection should be one
that simply precludes any differentiation or classification of persons on the basis of
race - regardless of the purpose or consequences of that differentiation. Thus
affirmative action programs are treated as analytically indistinguishable from racial
classifications that are used to create or perpetuate a system of racial subordination.
7. 669 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1996).
8. The case is discussed infra in notes 74-95.
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program for minority contractors. The court went beyond federal law
to hold that the state constitutional prohibition against such an
affirmative action program is absolute, regardless of whether a
particular program might be shown to be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest-such as, for example, society's
compelling need to redress the continuing effects of prior
discrimination. The decision in LAGC has had and will continue to
have a profound impact on the ability of state institutions in
Louisiana to fulfill promise of Brown. Race-conscious affirmative
action in Louisiana has largely ceased, except insofar as such efforts
are directly mandated by federal law.
For one who, like me, both advocates a vision of civil rights and
constitutional equality that would encourage rather than prohibit good
faith efforts to target remedial programs for the benefit of those still
suffering from the continuing effects of a history of discrimination,
and who also hopes for a more pluralistic legal dialogue on the
meaning and application of deep constitutional ideas, the decision in
LAGC is problematic indeed. I applaud the apparent desire of the
Louisiana Supreme Court to develop an independent body of doctrine
regarding the meaning of "human dignity" as defined and guaranteed
by the state constitution. However, as one who also believes that at
least some forms of affirmative action are necessary to achieve real
world equality, I mourn the actual result of LAGC. Thus the
problems that this presentation seeks to address: how is it that a state
constitution that was born in the early 1970s, during the last
flowering of traditional civil rights ideology, came to be interpreted
instead as an obstacle to real-world progress on these issues? Was
the unfortunate result in LAGC inevitable? Are the factors that led to
LA GC unique to Louisiana or are they likely to plague efforts in other
states to use state constitutional sources to develop a more
progressive vision of what a guarantee of equality means? To these
questions we turn.
PART I: THE ROAD TO LAGC: CIVIL RIGHTS AND EQUALITY
GUARANTEES IN THE CONSTITUTIONS OF LOUISIANA
Before examining the reasoning of the LAGC decision, it is
necessary to trace a bit of Louisiana's constitutional history.
Louisiana leads the nation in number of constitutions, having adopted
no less than eleven constitutions in the last 190 years. Despite this
plethora of constitutions, however, concepts of human rights in
general, and constitutional equality in particular, appeared only lately
and remained, until recently, controversial in Louisiana law.
2003]
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A. Of Rights and Reaction: The Louisiana Tradition Before 1974
Unlike the original constitutions of many other states, the original
Louisiana Constitution of 1812 contained no separate Declaration of
Rights. Perhaps reflecting the Spanish and French heritage of the
territory, the government it created has been termed a "government
of gentlemen" in which the franchise was limited to free white
property owning or tax paying males-a requirement that limited
voting rights to approximately one-third of the free adult males.9
Despite the absence of a separate Declaration of Rights, the 1812
Constitution did contain some particular provisions protecting certain
individual rights, including limitations on the definition and proof of
treason,10 adoption of Anglo-American rules of criminal procedure, 1
prohibition against expostfacto laws, 2 protection of the freedom of
the press and of speech, 3 and protection of the right of emigration
from the state. 4 Conspicuous by their absence were any provisions
relating to inherent rights of individuals, equality or due process of
law.
The Louisiana Constitutions of 1845 and 1852 reflected the
Jacksonian democratic revolution that swept the United States in the
1830s and 40s. The main thrust of both documents was to extend
suffrage to more free white adult males, to replace appointed officials
with elected officers, to reform and democratize the judiciary, and to
authorize extensive state participation in "internal improvements"
within the state. 5 These constitutions also lacked any separate state
Declaration of Rights, but the "General Provisions" articles of both
did continue the specific guarantees and prohibitions of the 1812
original, as well as adding a few more minor rights-related
provisions. 6 Once again, these Jacksonian constitutions demonstrated
9. Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide
(Greenwood Press, New York 1991), at 2-3.
10. La. Const of 1812, art. VI, § 2. Old Louisiana constitutions are available
from a variety of sources. One of the most convenient, which collects all of the
superceded versions is Benjamin Wall Dart, Constitutions of the State of Louisiana
and Selected Federal Laws (Bobbs Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1932).
11. La. Const of 1812, art. VI, secs. 18 (right to be heard, counsel,
confrontation, compulsory process, indictment or information, speedy jury trial,
freedom from compelled self-incrimination), 19 (bail, habeas corpus).
12. La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 20.
13. La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 21.
14. La. Const. of 1812, art. VI, § 22.
15. Hargrave, supra note 9 at 3-6. Alden L. Powell, A History of Louisiana
Constitutions, Project of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana, with Notes and
Studies, Vol. One, Part I, La. St. L.I. (Baton Rouge 1954) [hereinafter "Powell"]
at 297-99, 334-41.
16. A separate bill of rights was proposed but rejected by the convention.
Powell, supra note 15, at 299. Regarding specific rights guarantees added, see,
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the state's continuing resistance to any general importation of the
common law tradition,' 7 and continued to lack any reference to
preexisting human or civil rights, equality, or due process of law
other than in the context of criminal procedure.
Louisiana's secession constitution of 1861 made no substantive
changes in the law, confining itself to a substitution of the
Confederate States for the United States of America as the object of
the state's national allegiance. In contrast, the Louisiana Constitution
of 1864-called for by the fiat of Union General Nathaniel Banks
and enacted by representatives of the City of New Orleans and of
that rump portion of Louisiana hinterland then occupied by federal
troops-did make at least a few rights-related changes.' The
Constitution still lacked any separate Declaration of Rights and
continued to limit the franchise to free white males.' 9 However, the
constitution of 1864 did abolish slavery and involuntary servitude,
one year before the Thirteenth Amendment accomplished the same
result in the rest of the nation.20 In addition, the new constitution
prohibited bills of attainder, prohibited laws impairing the obligation
of contracts or divesting vested rights, unless for public use and with
adequate compensation,21 prohibited unreasonable searches and
seizures, 2 guaranteed that courts would be open and that "every
person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without denial or unreasonable delay. 23
Criminal penalties were required to be "proportioned to the nature of
the offense,"24 and the legislature was authorized to provide for
change of venue in both civil and criminal cases. In many, though
surely not all, of these changes, the influence of the federal Bill of
Rights as a model can readily be seen. More to the point, while
enactment of these provisions shows that the drafters of 1864 did
adhere to some aspects of the ideology of human rights, the 1864
e.g., La. Const. of 1845, Title VI, art. 109, protecting unspecified "vested rights;"
and Title VI, art. 107, requiring that criminal proceedings start with an indictment
or information. Not all changes were pro-rights, however. The constitution of
1852;, among other things, greatly limited the right to bail. La. Const. of 1852, a
rt. 104 (denying bail for any person accused of a crime punishable by hard labora.
17. La. Const. of 1845, art. 120, prohibiting the legislature from adopting any
"system or code of laws" by general reference.
18. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 7-8; Powell, supra note 15, at 350-54.
19. La. Const. of 1864, Title III, art. 14.
20. La. Const. of 1864, Title I, arts. 1 & 2.
21. La. Const. of 1864, Title VII, art. 109.
22. La. Const. of 1864, Title VII, art. 108.
23. La. Const. of 1864, Title VII, art. 110.
24. La. Const. of 1864, Title VII, art. 94.
25. La. Const. of 1986, Title VII, art. 115.
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constitution continued to avoid any reference to "equality" or to the
inherent (substantive) rights of man.
In contrast, the Louisiana Constitution of 1868, enacted at the
flood tide of radical reconstruction2 6 did, for the first time, feature a
state Bill of Rights." In addition to collecting and continuing the
individual rights provisions that had gradually been enacted in
previous constitutions, the new Bill of Rights contained, for the first
time, several provisions that embodied a robust commitment to
equality and civil rights for all the state's citizens. It began, fittingly
enough, with words taken from the Declaration of Independence:
Art. 1. All men are created free and equal, and have certain
inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
It continued with a strongly worded commitment to racial and legal
equality (as well as to federal supremacy), in words that echoed, but
in some ways went beyond, the language of the federal Fourteenth
Amendment:
Art. 2. All person[s,] without regard to race, color, or
previous condition, born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and residents of this
State for one year, are citizens of this State. The citizens of
this State owe allegiance to the United States; and this
allegiance is paramount to that which they owe the State.
They shall enjoy the same civil, political and public rights
and privileges, and be subject to the same pains and
penalties.28
The drafters of the 1868 constitution went on to guarantee that public
accommodations and utilities would be open to all, in language that,
26. Despite the hopes of its drafters, the Louisiana Constitution of 1864 failed
either to create a stable polity that could include both newly freed slaves and
returning Confederate soldiers, or to satisfy the radical majority in the federal
Congress. The federal Reconstruction Acts ultimately declared that no legal
government existed in the state. General Phillip Sheridan, in his capacity as the
federal military governor of the state, called for a new convention, delegates to
which were to be elected by all adult males, of any race, who were willing to swear
that they had not aided the Confederacy - a provision that effectively excluded half
of the white population of the state. The constitutional convention thus elected had
an equal number of white and black delegates, though many of the white delegates
were widely viewed as carpetbaggers. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 8-9; Powell,
supra note 15, at 369-70.
27. La. Const. of 1868, Title I.
28. La. Const. of 1868, Title I, art. 2.
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again, echoed but went beyond the federal Reconstruction era Civil
Rights statutes:
Art. 13. All persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges
upon any conveyance of a public character; and all places of
business, or of public resort, or for which a license is required
by either State, parish or municipal authority, shall be deemed
places of a public character, and shall be opened to the
accommodation and patronage of all persons, without
distinction or discrimination on account of race or color.29
Finally, in addition to new provisions guaranteeing freedom of
worship3" and outlawing attempts to limit freedmen's wages,3' the
Louisiana Bill of Rights closed, in words echoing the federal Tenth
Amendment, with a reaffirmation of the natural law faith that human
rights are inherent and pre-existing:
Art. 14. The rights enumerated in this title shall not be
construed to limit or abridge other rights of the people not
herein expressed.
The vision of equality and inherent human and civil rights that
was thus embodied in the 1868 Louisiana Bill of Rights was, from
the outset, an alien interpolation rather than an outgrowth of any
indigenous Louisiana tradition. The regime which enacted the 1868
constitution was supported, in large part, by federal bayonets. More
importantly, the vision of human rights embodied in the 1868
Declaration of Rights had its roots in traditions of natural law and
egalitarianism that were contrary to Louisiana's civilian legal code
and its persistently elitist social traditions. Nonetheless, this new
conception of human rights was given a hospitable reception in the
Louisiana courts. In a series of cases in 1875 and 1876, the
Louisiana Supreme Court construed Article 13, and the state statute
enacted to enforce it,32 as creating a substantive right to be free from
invidious discrimination because of race in a broad range of areas of
public accommodations, including eating and sleeping
accommodations aboard a Mississippi River steamboat,33 service in
29. La. Const. of 1868, Title I, art. 14.
30. La Const. of 1868, Title I, art. 12.
31. La. Const. of 1868, Title I, art. 11.
32. Act. No. 38 of the Louisiana Legislature (1869) entitled An Act "[tlo
enforce the Thirteenth Article of the Constitution of this State ... " provided that
"all persons" in the state must be afforded non discriminatory service by common
carriers, public facilities and licensed businesses in the state, and provided that a
party injured by an unjustified refusal of services could recover damages.
33. DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875), rev'd sub nom., Hall v. DeCuir,
95 U.S. 485 (1877). In DeCuir, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld an award of
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a New Orleans coffeehouse,34 and attendance at a theater.35 These
decisions were quite progressive, anticipating in many respects both
the reasoning and ideology of Brown and its progeny. In each case,
the plaintiff brought his or her claim directly under Louisiana Act 3 8
of 1869, a statute enacted to enforce Article 13. However, the
Louisiana Court made clear that the constitutional article was self-
executing and embodied a substantive right that could be enforced
regardless of the existence of any statute.36 The court at least
implicitly rejected arguments that provisions of equal but separate
accommodations would suffice under Article 1335 and upheld the
award of very substantial damages, recognizing that the psychic
injury that results from forced segregation is a very real form of
personal humiliation and degradation." It is also worthy of note that
the court in DeCuir, in the course of rejecting the argument that
forcing a private party's to provide nondiscriminatory service would
offend that entity's property rights, relied on the common law
tradition regarding the obligation of common carriers to provide
service to all without preference or distinction.39
When white supremacist forces regained control of the state in the
late 1870s, they lost little time in replacing the Constitution of 1868
with the so-called "Long Constitution" of 1879.40 The Bill of Rights
$1,000.00 to a wealthy of African-American lady, who suffered "mental pain,
shame and mortification" when she was denied admittance to the main cabin aboard
the steamboat "Governor Allen." In reversing, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that Louisiana law outlawed discrimination, but held that application
of state law to a steamboat engaged in commerce on a navigable river violated
Congress' exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce.
34. Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14 (1875). In Sauvinet, plaintiff also won
a judgment of $1,000.00 when he was denied service in a New Orleans restaurant,
solely because of his race.
35. Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876). In Bidwell, the plaintiff
originally was awarded $5,000.00 when refused admission to a theater solely
because of his race. The Supreme Court reduced the award to $300.00.
36. See, e.g., DeCuir, supra note 31, at 4 ("In truth, the right of the plaintiff to
sue would be the same, whether act No. 38 existed or not .... "); Bidwell, supra
note 33, at 383 ("[Article 13] of the constitution does not enunciate a mere
abstraction, but it guarantees substantial rights. To facilitate enforcement of these
rights the General Assembly has enacted laws, and it is the duty of the courts when
called upon, to enforce thern").
37. DeCuir, supra note 31, at 3 (fifth assignment of error).
38. See, e.g., DeCuir, supra note 31, at 2, reciting indicia of plaintiffs
gentility, and the humiliation that plaintiff suffered when she was refused
permission to eat at the common table with other (white) passengers. Anticipating
Justice Harlan's dissent inPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 16 S. Ct. 1138,
1144 (1896), the Court in DeCuir was explicit in holding that a refusal of service
based solely on race can never be "reasonable." DeCuir, 27 La. Ann. at 6.
39. DeCuir, 27 La. Ann. at 6.
40. So called because of the numerous restrictions that the constitution placed
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was retained, along with the prohibition of slavery4' and the reserved
rights clause.4 2 Provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms and
prohibiting quartering troops in private houses, closely modeled on
the federal Second and Third Amendments, respectively, were also
added. 3 However, the major change in constitutional protection of
rights embodied in the 1879 constitution was repeal of the previous
constitution's declaration of the free and equal rights of man, the
guarantee of equal protection and the prohibition against
discrimination in public accommodations and conveyances. It is an
accurate reflection of the spirit of the 1879 constitution that, when
Homer Plessy sought to challenge the Louisiana statute of 1890 that
affirmatively required racial separation in public conveyances within
the state, he relied only on the federal Constitution." The Louisiana
Constitution of that day no longer had any relevance to his case.
The Constitution of 1898 continued this counterrevolution,
having as its primary purpose the disenfranchisement of black and
poor white voters.4 Changes in the Bill of Rights were few but
significant, including insertion of a pure "due process" clause
seemingly modeled directly on the federal Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,46 and perhaps surprisingly, repeal of the prohibition
against slavery.47  The Constitution of 1913, called amidst
controversy and fiscal crisis, in an effort to fund the state's growing
debt,48 made no significant changes in rights protection.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 began as an effort at serious
reform, but soon bogged down amidst the largely successful efforts
of innumerable special interests to get their pet projects put beyond
the reach of the legislature.49 Like its 1913 predecessor, it made little
overt change in the state Bill of Rights. However, a couple of
intriguing cases from this era suggest that judges in Louisiana
continued, at least occasionally, to provide remedies for violations of
upon a legislature that had come to be seen as thoroughly tainted by scandal.
Hargrave, supra note 9, at 9-11. Powell, supra note 15, at 383-86, 389, 400-05.
41. La. Const. of 1879, arts. 1-13. It is noteworthy, however, that the
prohibition against slavery was, in the 1879 constitution, relegated to the position
of inclusion among a miscellany of criminal procedure provisions. La. Const. of
1879, art. 5.
42. La. Const. of 1879, art. 13.
43. La. Const. of 1879, arts. 3, 162.
44. Ex Parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 83, 11 So. 948-49 (La. 1892), aff'd sub
nom, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
45. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 11-12, Powell, supra note 15, at 426-30.
46. La. Const. of 1898, art. 2.
47. La. Const. of 1898, art. 9, continuing the provisions regarding criminal
prosecutions from the 1879 Constitution, but deleting the prohibition against
slavery.
48. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 11-13; Powell, supra note 15, at 447-50.
49. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 13-16.
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a non-statutory, apparently inherent, principle of human dignity and
of the right to be free from unjustifiable discrimination, at least in the
sense of unjustifiable exclusion from ordinary public services or
unnecessary imposition of public humiliation attendant upon such
exclusion." While these cases bear some conceptual similarity to the
earlier cases decided under the 1868 Constitution, none of these cases
referred directly to any constitutional provision, state or federal; and
certainly none suggested any challenge to the then-prevailing system
of racial apartheid. Indeed the cases do not agree among themselves
regarding the legal basis of their holdings, being based in one case on
Louisiana's Civil Code article 2315, 5' in another on asserted
differences between Louisiana and common law regarding recovery
of psychic damages for breach of contract,52 and in another case on
no cited legal rule at all.53
For anyone trying to find evidence of a tradition of protection of
fundamental civil rights through state law, these cases are thin gruel
indeed. None referred explicitly to the state constitution. Indeed, the
cases did not even agree among themselves regarding the source of
the rights they sought to protect. It may be that this very incoherence
gives evidence of the survival of a basic idea ofjudicial protection of
human dignity in Louisiana, despite the absence of explicit
constitutional or common law authority, and despite the active repeal
of those provisions of the 1868 constitution that might have provided
grounding for such a tradition. Perhaps. But it never amounted to
much.
B. The "Human Dignity'" Guarantee of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921, like many of its
predecessors, was particularly long and statutory in its content. Many
50. Thus, inMalczewskiv. New Orleans Ry. &Light Co., 156 La. 830, 101 So.
213 (1924), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that statutory guarantees of access
to public accommodations did not preclude a street railway operator from excluding
"jitneys" from a free parking lot at its proprietary amusement park, but that an
official's use of rough language against the woman thus excluded inflicted
unnecessary humiliation, and justified an award of damages. In Planchard v. Klaw
& Erlanger New Orleans Theaters Co., 166 La. 235, 117 So. 2d 132 (1928), a
theater owner whose employees threw a patron out of a theater without reasonable
cause committed an offense justifying a substantial award of damages. In Vogel v.
Saenger Theaters, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945) a theater owner who
excluded a cripple from his theater was liable in substantial damages for the
humiliation thus inflicted.
51. Malczewski, 156 La. at 835-37, 101 So. at 215.
52. Vogel, 207 La. at 842-44, 22 So. 2d at 191.
53. Planchard, 166 La. at 238-40, 117 So. at 133.
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ordinary matters that should have been handled by the legislature
could only be altered by constitutional amendment.' Between 1921
and 1972, the Louisiana Legislature proposed no less than 802
separate amendments for ratification by the voters. Of that total, 536
separate amendments were adopted by the voters and made part of
the state constitution. In 1970, the legislature proposed fifty-three
separate amendments for ratification. In 1972, it proposed forty-two
more. Not surprisingly, the voters rebelled. The great majority of
voters simply refused to vote on any of the amendments. Those few
who did rejected all of the 1970 proposals, and all but six of those in
1972." Clearly a crisis was at hand.
In response to this popular revolt, then newly elected governor
Edwin Edwards called for a convention to draft a new, shorter and
more workable constitution for the state. The legislature quickly
passed enabling legislation and the Convention began meeting late in
1973. Its deliberations continued through the spring and early
summer of 1974. In the fall of 1974, the voters of the state ratified
the new charter, though by a notably slim majority.56
Though the basic impetus behind the Louisiana Constitution of
1974 had nothing to do with concerns about the protection of rights,
the timing of the convention was propitious for friends of civil rights.
The early 1970s were a time when popular acceptance of the civil
rights agenda was running relatively high, both in the nation and in
the state. By 1974, Louisiana was emerging from the era of "massive
resistance" to Brown v. Board of Education and subsequent federal
efforts to enforce its requirements. Governor Edwards, who
supported the call for the convention and who exercised considerable
influence over a large number of delegates, had recently been elected
by a coalition of black, urban, Cajun and poor white
voters-precisely the constituency which might be expected to favor
use of the state constitution as an engine for aggressive protection of
civil rights and for redressing the state's endemic racial and
economic inequalities. White resistance to race based affirmative
action programs had not yet reached nearly the same force that it
would have later. In the legal community, the question of how civil
rights and constitutional guarantees of equality should be defined was
very much up in the air; scholars who argued that the essential
requirement of constitutional equality was to affirmatively dismantle
the structures and traditions of racial and gender subordination were
at least as numerous as those who rejected affirmative action on the
ground that equal protection required governments to be strictly
54. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 13.
55. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 16.
56. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 17-18.
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"race-blind." The Bakke case," which began the process by which
the federal Supreme Court defined the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equal protection as requiring a compelling interest
justification for any departure from race-blindness, and which
therefore precluded most efforts at race-based affirmative action, was
still four years in the future.
In accord with the spirit of the time, the majority of the delegates
to the 1973 Convention clearly shared the view that the Louisiana
Declaration of Rights should be substantially amended so as to bring
it into compliance with the then-contemporary, expansive, Warren
Court-era definitions and protections of rights. Examples of such
changes include the new Declaration's explicit guarantees of the right
of privacy; 9 the right to vote;60 the right to be free from
57. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733
(1978). Though no opinion in Bakke garnered the support of a majority, Justice
Powell's controlling opinion did apply "strict scrutiny" to the academic affirmative
action program at issue there. The intimations of Bakke proved correct when a
majority of the Court held that "strict scrutiny" applied to any governmental
classification on the basis ofrace, including affirmative action programs, regardless
of motive. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706
(1989).
58. It has become an article of faith in Louisiana that the Declaration of Rights
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 was intended to afford citizens of the state
even greater protection of rights than is available under federal law. See, e.g., Lee
Hargrave, The Declaration ofRights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,35 La.
L. Rev. 1, 1 (1974); Louis "Woody" Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy.
L. Rev. 9 (1975); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992) ("[T]he Louisiana
constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than does the federal
Constitution... "); Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438, 448 (1976) (to same effect).
This point was expressly made by the drafters of the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights. See, e.g., comments of Delegate Woody Jenkins introducing the draft
Declaration of Rights, VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of
1972: Convention Transcripts, (1977) [hereinafter "Records: Convention
Transcripts"], p. 990, 37th day's proceedings, August 28, 1993 ("The onlypurpose
of having a Bill of Rights in our State Constitution is to grant additional protection
that is not given to us by the Federal Constitution.").
59. La. Const. art. I, § 5. This provision was intended to incorporate the federal
Griswold line of "autonomy-privacy" cases explicitly into the state constitution.
Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 415 (La. 1988). See generally John
Devlin, Privacy andAbortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could
Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L. Rev. 685, 698-707
(1991), detailing the drafting history of section 5.
60. La. Const. art. I, § 10. Previous Louisiana constitutions had expressly
limited suffrage, imposing an imposing set ofresidency, character, literacy, and age
requirements on the right. In rejecting most of those restrictions and instead
guaranteeing a right to vote for all mentally competent non-incarcerated citizens
over the age of 18, the drafters of the 1974 Declaration clearly drew upon ideas




discrimination in public accommodations; 6' the right to a Miranda
warning before interrogation; 62 and the right to assistance of counsel
in criminal proceedings. 63 As is evident from this list, the drafters of
the Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 were
inspired by and wished both to emulate and to expand upon ideas
about protection of rights that were initially articulated by the federal
Supreme Court interpreting the federal Bill of Rights and federal
statutory law.
Another manifestation of the desire of the framers of the 1974
Declaration to emulate and go beyond then-current federal law can
be found in the Declaration's treatment of the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. In one sense, the Convention's treatment of
this issue can be seen as manifesting a desire to depart from federal
law. The Convention rejected a proposal that would have simply
guaranteed "equal protection of the laws" in words virtually identical
to those used in the federal Fourteenth Amendment', and adopted
instead a proposal containing very different language indeed:
Section 3. Right to Individual Dignity
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or
religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against
a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and
involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case
as punishment for crime.6'
61. La. Const. art. I, § 12. This new section applies to privately as well as
publicly owned facilities, and was directly inspired by the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See generally Hargrave, supra note 9, at 35.
62. La. Const. art. I, § 13.
63. Id.
64. Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 58 at 1022-28, 38th day's
proceedings, August 24, 1973.
65. La. Const. art. I, § 3. As originally proposed by the Committee on Bill of
Rights and Elections, the text prohibited any "discrimination" based on any of the
enumerated bases, reading as follows:
Section 3. Right to individual dignity.
Section 3. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor
shall any law discriminate against a person in the exercise of rights on
account of birth, race, age, sex, social origin, physical condition , or
political or religious ideas. Slavery and involuntary servitude are
prohibited, except in the latter case as a punishment for crime.
IV Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 58, at 10 15-16. Many delegates
expressed concern that this provision would preclude reasonable and necessary
distinctions based on age or gender. See, e.g., id. at 1016-17 (colloquy of Mr.
Rayburn and Mr. Roy, regarding Mr. Rayburn's concern that the provision would
abolish mandatory retirement provisions); Id. at 1019 (statement of Miss Perkins,
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In another sense, however, the influence of federal law, and of
federal Supreme Court precedent, can be readily seen. The first and
fourth sentences of section 3 are essentially copied verbatim from the
federal Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments respectively. The
second sentence explicitly singles out discrimination based on race
or religion for special treatment, just as federal jurisprudence had, at
the time, identified government acts which distinguished of such
grounds as requiring the highest degree of scrutiny.66 The third
sentence lists a series of other possible grounds for classification,
most of which had been proposed as candidates for some form of
heightened scrutiny under federal law, but which had not yet clearly
achieved such a status.67 Indeed, the very organization of the middle
expressing concern that language requiring gender equality would adversely affect
a divorced woman's entitlement to alimony). Defenders of the proposed article
emphasized throughout that the prohibition on "discrimination" was not intended
to forbid all distinctions based on the enumerated categories, but rather only those
which the state could not show to be "reasonable." Debate continued without
resolution, however, until the close that day's session.
When the convention reconvened the next morning, the Committee on Bill of
Rights and Elections proposed, as a substitute, the language now found in § 3. VI
Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 58 at 1029, 39th day's proceedings,
August 30, 1979. The substitute proposal was intended "to account all that was said
yesterday" and respond to the concerns raised. Id. (remarks of Mr. Dennery). The
substitute was adopted by the convention with virtually no further debate. Id. at
1030.
66. The federal doctrine of "strict scrutiny" originated in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944), and was refined and defined in a series
of subsequent cases, including Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967). Today, it seems clear that government acts which classify on the basis of
race, and which visit harms upon minorities will seldom, if ever, pass constitutional
muster. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
67. As of 1974, federal law was unclear as to the standard of review that should
be applied, in cases brought under the 14th Amendment, to government acts that
allegedly discriminated on the basis of, for example, sex, age, or illegitimacy. In
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971), the court purported to apply only
"rational basis" scrutiny to a state law that favored men over women as
administrators of estates. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764
(1973), a plurality of the court favored treating women as a "suspect class" and
subjecting laws discriminating against women to "strict" scrutiny. It was not until
1976 in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 45 (1976) that the Supreme Court
settled on the current standard of "intermediate" scrutiny for claims of gender
discrimination brought under the federal Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, in the
early 1970's, the federal Supreme Court gave conflicting signals regarding whether
discrimination against non-marital children would receive "rational basis" scrutiny
or something more. Compare, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 88 S. Ct.
1509, 1511 (1968) (stating that the test is whether "the line drawn is a rational one,"
though noting that the court was "extremely sensitive" to discrimination on such a
basis) and Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532,91 S. Ct. 1017 (1971) (applying a very
low standard of review), with Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.
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two sentences of section 3 structurally mirrors the federal "tier"
system of review as that system was beginning to emerge in the
1970s, with race and religion separated out and identified as being the
least acceptable bases of distinction among persons, certain other
bases of classification separated out for review under a lesser, but
still meaningful, standard, and, impliedly, all other bases for
classification relegated to a third and even lower standard of review.
Though the language of section 3 clearly differs from its federal
model, that difference in language consists, to a large degree, merely
in making explicit what had already been held to be implicit in the
federal Fourteenth Amendment.
It is certainly clear that the framers of section 3 did intend to go
beyond then-current federal law in certain substantive respects-by
establishing some form of serious scrutiny for all the bases of
discrimination listed, by identifying classifications based on "culture"
and "physical condition" as candidates for some form of special
scrutiny and, with respect to classifications based on race or religion,
using language that appears to go beyond even the federal
"compelling interest" standard and impose instead an absolute
prohibition against "discrimination" on those grounds. Nonetheless
both the language of section 3 and the constitutional history of
Louisiana, outlined above, make it equally clear that the basic ideas
embodied in that section-that equality is a basic right, that race and
religion are particularly inappropriate bases for classification, that
certain other bases of classification, such as those based on gender or
legitimacy of birth, also require some significant scrutiny-were
derived from federal models, rather than from any indigenous
Louisiana tradition.
Louisiana courts were slow to recognize the potential
implications of the unique language of section 3. From 1974 until
1985, Louisiana courts simply followed federal precedent in
interpreting section 3, adopting and applying the federal "tier" system
of review despite the historical and textual distinctions that could be
drawn between the federal Fourteenth Amendment and its Louisiana
analogue.6" In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors69 the Louisiana
Ct. 1400 (1972) (appearing to provide a stronger standard) and Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) (to same effect). It was not until 1988, in
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988) that the court finally settled
on its current "intermediate" level of security for claims of this type. With regard
to discrimination based on age, lower federal courts had, as of 1974, reached
varying results. It was not until Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) that the court finally held that the 14"1 Amendment
provided only "rational basis" review of distinctions based on age.
68. See, e.g., the original Supreme Court decision in Sibley v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985), in which the court analyzed plaintiff's
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Supreme Court, for the first time, rejected the federal "tier" model for
analysis of equal protection issues. Relying on the unique language
of section 3 and on the expressed intent of the drafters of the 1974
Declaration to provide constitutional protection for members of
groups not adequately protected by existing federal constitutional
jurisprudence,7" the Sibley court instead constructed an analysis of
section 3 that would subject almost all assertions of violation to
single standard of review: whether the challenged government action
"suitably furthers a legitimate state purpose."7 The categories
enumerated in the third sentence of section 3 were distinguished from
other "unenumerated" bases of classification by a shifting burden of
proof. If the government is shown to have discriminated against a
person on the basis of one of the enumerated categories, the
government bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the
discrimination is "arbitrar[y], capricious[]or unreasonabl[e]" or
whether it instead suitably furthers an appropriate governmental
purpose. If the alleged discrimination is on some other basis,
plaintiff bears the burden of proof.72
The court in Sibley also addressed the second sentence of section
3, which separates out government discrimination on the basis of race
or religion for special treatment. As the court noted, the convention
modified the original draft of section 3, as proposed by the drafting
committee, which originally grouped "race" and "religion" with all
the other enumerated categories.73 The court concluded that the
section 3 claim in a manner indistinguishable from federal analysis of similar
claims alleging violation of the 14th Amendment.
69. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985). Plaintiff in Sibley was a young woman who
suffered extensive physical injuries and massive brain damage as a result of the
negligence of a hospital owned-and-operated by the state. By the time the case
came before the court, the plaintiffs direct medical expenses alone had already
almost reached $500,000. On rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a
statute which imposed a hard $500,000 cap on damage awards against state
hospitals effectively distinguished between persons who suffered catastrophic
injuries and those who suffered lesser harms by allowing only members of the latter
group to obtain full recovery, and that such a distinction constituted a
discrimination based on "physical condition" under the meaning of section 3. The
court remanded the case to allow the state an opportunity to show that the
discrimination was not, in this case, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
70. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107-08. Justice Dennis, who authored the opinion
in Sibley, was in a particularly good position to discern the intentions of the drafters
of section 3. Justice Dennis had been a delegate to the Louisiana Constitutional
Convention of 1973, and was a member of the committee on Bill of Rights and
Elections, which drafted the present Louisiana Declaration of Rights, including
section 3.
71. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1109.
72. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1108.
73. See supra note 65 for the text of the original proposal.
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second sentence, as modified and enacted, requires that, "[w]hen the
law classifies individuals by race or religious beliefs, it shall be
-repudiated completely."74 Though only dictum in the context of
Sibley, this language would later prove important indeed.
PART II: STATE CONSTITUTIONS, EQUALITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
ON THE CONCEPTUAL HEGEMONY OF FEDERAL LAW AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL VOICE
Having traced the development of Louisiana's constitutional
guarantee of equality, it is now possible to address the central
questions posed: why the decision in LAGC came out as it did; and
whether that case holds implications for decisions on similar issues
in other states.
A. Why Louisiana 's Constitution Will Not Provide an Independent
State Voice: LAGC as a Case Study in the Intellectual Hegemony
of Federal Law
In Louisiana Associated General Contractors v. State 5 the
Louisiana Supreme Court considered a complaint brought by an
association of contractors, challenging the constitutionality of the
then-applicable Louisiana Minority and Women's Business
Enterprise Act.76 That statute required state agencies to set aside up
to ten percent of all construction or procurement contracts for bid by
qualified minority-owned businesses, and up to two percent for bid77
by qualified women-owned businesses. The challenged statute
could well have been struck down under the federal Fourteenth
Amendment since it imposed a relatively rigid quota, and therefore
would likely be held insufficiently closely related to any
demonstrated compelling governmental interest in remedying prior
state sponsored discrimination. 7' However, in LAGC the Louisiana
74. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107.
75. 669 So. 2d 1185 (La. 1996). This case has been analyzed in Mary Ann
Wolf, Comment, Louisiana's Equal Protection Guarantee: Questions About the
Supreme Court Decision Prohibiting Affirmative Action, 58 La. L. Rev. 1209
(1998).
76. La. R.S. 93:1951-91 (1989).
77. La. Ass'n Gen Contractors, 669 So. 2dat 1188.
78. The Louisiana statute at issue in LAGCwas quite similar to the federal set-
aside programs struck down in Croson and Adarand. For example, the statute was
defined in part in terms of race, with no indication that the legislature had
considered non-race-based alternatives. The program was structured as a relatively
rigid "quota" system which required that a fixed percentage of construction
contracts be designated as ones for which only certified minorities or women-owned
businesses could compete. Such features made it highly likely that a court applying
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Supreme Court took the opportunity to go significantly farther than
even the federal Supreme Court had gone. The court interpreted
section 3 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights to absolutely prohibit
any form of state sponsored race-based affirmative
action-regardless of whether such activity was "necessary" to
achieve any "compelling" governmental interest in remedying the
effects of prior state sponsored discrimination.79 According to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, apparently, all forms of race conscious
affirmative action are illegal in Louisiana, even when plainly
necessary and narrowly tailored to remedy the current effects of past
discrimination.
The court in LAGC was undoubtedly correct that the text of
section 3 differs from the federal Fourteenth Amendment, and
therefore may be subject to an interpretation that diverges from
federal precedent. The court was also correct in holding that the
intent of the framers of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights was to go
beyond federal law and guarantee Louisiana's citizens greater
protection of certain rights than would be available under the federal
Bill of Rights. And, finally, the LAGC court was correct in
concluding that the second sentence of section 3 does, by its plain
terms, absolutely prohibit "discrimination" on the basis of race.
Nonetheless, the result in LAGC is subject to criticism, on several
levels.
The most salient flaw in the LAGC court's reasoning concerns the
meaning of the word "discriminate," as that word is used in section
3. In LAGC, the court asserted that the meaning of the second
sentence of section 3 was so "clear and unambiguous" as to preclude
resort to the drafting history of the provision, the debate among the
delegates to the convention, or any other source of guidance
regarding the understanding of the framers as to what it means to
"discriminate."8 This claim seems difficult to justify. Surely the
state's actions belie any contention that section 3 was clearly or
widely understood, at the time it was enacted or for many years
thereafter, to preclude affirmative action. On the contrary, the state
engaged in various affirmative action programs for more than twenty
years after the Declaration of Rights was enacted, without any
indication that these practices might violate the state constitution.
More importantly, during the 1970s, the meaning of
"discriminate" was a matter of significant legal and philosophical
debate. There was certainly no consensus that race-conscious
the Croson and Adarand analysis would reach a result similar to that reached in
those cases.
79. La. Ass'n Gen. Contractors, 669 So. 2dat 1195-98.
80. LAGC, 669 So. 2d at 1196.
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affirmative action programs constituted acts of "discrimination"
against those not benefitted by such programs. To cite just one
example, in United Steelworkers v. Weber8' the United States
Supreme Court would shortly hold that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which likewise made it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual" with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment because of that person's race, 2 did not
preclude an employer from adopting voluntary race-conscious
affirmative action programs designed to remedy a persistent racial
imbalance in its workforce. My point is certainly not that the court
in LA GC necessarily should have been guided by Weber or any other
particular federal precedent. Rather the point is simply that the
meaning of "discriminate" was not, in 1974, so "clear and
unambiguous."83
If one does look to the proceedings of the Louisiana constitutional
convention, it is far from obvious that the framers of section 3
understood the word "discriminate" to include equally, without
distinction, both traditional Louisiana patterns of subordination on
the basis of race and subsequent efforts to remedy the continuing
effects of that history of subordination. To be sure, some evidence
does support the LA GC court's conclusions. As was noted above, the
Sibley court stated, in passing, that the second sentence of section 3
prohibited any "classification" on the basis of race.84 However, that
case did not involve any issue of race, and did not analyze the
question in any detail. A better source of support for the LAGC
court's view-though one not cited in the decision-is a committee
report by the Committee on Bill of Rights and Elections, which
drafted the Declaration of Rights, which stated that an earlier draft of
what ultimately became section 3 was intended, among other
purposes, to prohibit "new forms of 'reverse discrimination' such as
the imposition of quotas.8 5 Certain comments made during the floor
debate on section 3 could likewise be interpreted as indicating that
the speaker thought that it would preclude all classifications on the
basis of race or religion, regardless of the state's invidious or
remedial purpose.86 And in an article written soon after the new
81. 443 U.S. 193, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003).
83. See Wolf, supra note 75, at 1220-28 making, in greater detail, an argument
similar to the argument made here.
84. See supra note 75, at 1224.
85. 1 Records of the Constitutional Convention of 1973: Official Journal of
Proceedings, supra note 58, at 86.
86. See, e.g., the comments ofdelegate Dennery, explaining that "[t]he authors
[of the adopted version of § 3] believe that there is absolutely no basis for any
discrimination of any sort on the basis of, or account of race or religion." Records:
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constitution was adopted, one of the delegates who served on the
committee which drafted the Declaration of Rights described the
effect of the second sentence of section 3 as requiring the state to be
"blind" to the race and religion of the persons with whom it deals,
and thus precluding "quotas. ' 7
However, substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. To a
certain extent, the evidence is negative. The official presentation of
section 3 by the committee on the Declaration of Rights to the
convention made no mention of any effect that section 3 would have
on existing or potential affirmative action programs."8 Nor did any
subsequent speaker during the debate on section 3 suggest anything
of the kind. It seems very unlikely that such a radical change in the
law would have passed without comment if the delegates had
understood or believed that section 3 "clearly and unambiguously"
so required. On the contrary, the discussion, insofar as it focused on
race, primarily concerned the need to overcome Louisiana's history
of discrimination against racial minorities, 9 and on the need to give
the state's black citizens a reason to vote for the new constitution.9"
It is hard to see how these expressed concerns can be squared with
any supposed original intent by the Convention to forever outlaw
race-based affirmative action in Louisiana.
In light of these interpretive difficulties and ambiguities, it is
perhaps not too surprising that the court in LAGC ultimately rested
its conclusion that section 3 outlawed any classifications based on
race on an analogy to federal law, arguing that the state Declaration
of Rights should be construed just like the federal Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted by the federal Supreme Court in Croson9"
and Adarand,92 as making no analytic distinction between remedial
and invidious uses of race.93 Not surprising perhaps, but also not
convincing. Cases decided fifteen or twenty years after the drafters
of the Louisiana Declaration or Rights met are unlikely to shed much
retroactive light on what they may have intended. And, in any event,
since the crucial term, "discriminate," does not appear in the text of
Convention Transcripts, supra note 58, at 1029, quoted in LA GC, 669 So. 2d at
1198 n.ll.
87. Jenkins, supra note 58 at 17, cited inLAGC, 669 So. 2d at 1198.
88. Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 58, at 1016 (remarks of Mr.
Roy).
89. See, e.g., statements of Delegate De Blieux, Records: Convention
Transcripts, supra note 58, at 1029.
90. Records: Convention Transcripts, supra note 58 at 1026 (remarks of Mr.
Jackson, the chair of the committee on Bill of Rights and Elections).
91. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
92. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
93. La. Ass'n of Gen. Contractors., 669 So. 2d at 1198 (extensively quoting
and adopting the reasoning of Adarand, in particular).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, federal cases construing that amendment
will not provide much legitimate guidance as to how that term should
be interpreted.
What then is one to make of LAGC? It may be tempting to see
the case as reflecting politics as much as legal analysis, as the
predictable result of an elected judiciary in a conservative state in an
era of popular opposition to many aspects of the traditional civil
rights agenda, affirmative action included. But the root causes of the
LAGC court's failure to really grapple with the hard questions-what
the word "discriminate" meant to the constitutional drafters of 1974,
and how it should be interpreted today-reflects deeper issues. What
the LAGC decision really demonstrates is how difficult it is for state
courts interpreting state constitutions to escape from the concepts and
reasoning of leading federal constitutional decisions. The court in
LAGC was well aware that the framers of the Louisiana Declaration
intended to guarantee citizens greater protection of rights than was
available under the federal constitution; 94 the court acknowledged
(indeed, stressed) that the text they were called upon to interpret
differed from its federal counterpart; it proudly announced that the
result it reached went beyond, and thus differed from, current federal
law.95 And yet, despite these protestations of independence, the
power of federal decisions remained strong. On the central issue of
the case, an interpretive issue which is simply not presented by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court in LA GC nonetheless seemed more
influenced by Justice Scalia's arguments about the meaning of the
14th amendment in Adarand than by any full and open minded
analysis of what the Louisiana draftsmen and delegates and voters
may have actually understood and intended, back in 1974. This is
independence only of a sort, independence of result but not real
independence of thought or analysis.
It is possible, however, to lay too much blame at the feet of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The gravitational pull of federal
constitutional law is always strongly felt by state courts interpreting
94. In this regard, LA GC also stands as a strong reminder of the weaknesses of
the common metaphor for the interaction of federal and state rights guarantees.
According to that metaphor, the federal Bill of Rights establishes a minimum level
of rights protection; state rights guarantees can grant "more" rights but not "less"
than the federal minimum. In LA GC, the court evidently thought it was "adding"
to the rights of citizens by absolutely prohibiting any classification by race, for any
purpose. However, the issue of affirmative action is one where legitimate claims
conflict. By adding to rights of some, the court necessarily adversely affected the
rights and expectations of others.
95. The divergence between Louisiana and federal law may have widened with
the very recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325 (2003), in which the
Court upheld the admissions program of the Michigan Law School, a program
which explicitly took race, among other factors, into account.
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state constitutions. The categories and concepts of federal
constitutional analysis are what we teach in the law schools; they
form the language lawyers use when they discuss constitutional
issues, whether in briefs or over beers. It is hard for any court to
break free. It is even harder for a court to break free of federal
models of analysis when, as in the case of Louisiana's constitutional
guarantee of equality, the state constitutional text was derived from
federal sources and models. As I have argued elsewhere, the mere
fact that a state constitutional right was originally derived from
federal sources is not sufficient reason for state courts to continue
thereafter to interpret and reinterpret that state provision in
conformity with the federal Court's changing interpretation of that
original federal model.96 However, it does make the temptation to do
so greater, particularly when the language of the state provision
provides a plausible basis for that interpretation and particularly
where, as in Louisiana, there exists little indigenous tradition of state
protection of equality rights to provide the basis for a coherent
alternative vision. The decision in LAGC may have been flawed, but
it may also have been predictable; Louisiana's (lack of) constitutional
tradition may have simply failed to provide the court with the raw
materials necessary for the creation of any truly independent analysis
of the state's guarantee of equality.
B. Other States and Other Visions: Traditions of Natural Law and
Human Dignity as a Possible Basis for an Independent Analysis
As has been pointed out by several scholars--one of whom, Bob
Williams, is in this room and will be speaking after me-State
Constitutional guarantees of equality and of the inherent rights of
individuals are, to put it mildly, a mixed lot. Some provisions, like
Louisiana's, are of recent vintage and closely mirror notions of
equality and civil rights as those concepts have been articulated in
federal jurisprudence. Others, however, are much older, and reflect
different intellectual traditions.97
96. John Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal
Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived From
Federal Sources, 3 Emerging Issues St. Const. Law 173, (1990).
97. The seminal article in the field is Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees
in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tex L. Rev. 1195 (1985). Williams notes that many
state constitutions do not have express guarantees of "equal protection," but that
most have language that, in one way or another, expresses notions of human
dignity and equality. Thus, for example, many older state constitutions, particularly
those dating from the founding decades, have language derived from natural law
philosophy and from the assertion in the Declaration of Independence that "all men
are created equal." Id. at 1199-1206. Another group of constitutions have
language derived from Jacksonian ideas of popular democracy, and are typically
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One of these independent traditions predates the founding of the
nation and draws upon concepts of natural law and natural rights that
were well known to the founders' generation. Examples of such
guarantees can be found in the constitutions of Virginia, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, among others. The
provisions vary in language, but all revolve around common themes
of the inherent dignity and equality of all persons, and the rejection
of government actions which would arbitrarily interfere with one's
person, property, or autonomy. A couple of examples will suffice
to give the flavor. The first of these, Section 1 of the Virginia Bill
of Rights (adopted in 1776) provides:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into
a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.'*
The Equivalent provision of the Connecticut Constitution states that:
All men, when they form a social compact, are equal in
rights....9
And in New Jersey, the constitution provides that:
All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety andhappiness. °°
phrased as prohibitions against the grant of special privileges to favored interests.
Id. at 2007-08. Reform movements of the late 19'h century produced constitutional
language which generally prohibited "special" or "local" laws. Id. at 2009-10, and
the 20th century brought still other provisions, often inspired by federal law, which
forbade "discrimination" in the exercise of civil rights. Id. at 2010-12.
98. Va. Const. Bill of Rights § 1 (1776).
99. Conn. Const. art. I, § 1 (1965).
100. N.J. Const. art. I, 1 (1947). The language of the Massachusetts
constitution was originally quite similar:
All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural essential and
inalienable unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness.
The provision was amended in 1976 to replace the word "men" with "people," and
to add the following as a second sentence: "Equality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin." Mass.
Const. pt. 1, art. 1, § 2 (1947).
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Such provisions had their origin in the colonies, but are not confined
to the original thirteen states. Similar provisions exist in the
constitutions of California, Kentucky, Florida and Alabama, among
other states.'0'
The question is, whether such texts can provide any traction for
an understanding of equality that can serve as a model to oppose the
current federal Supreme Court's equation of "equal protection" with
"non-classification." My answer, in brief, is that they haven't yet
fulfilled that role, but that they can.
As Professor Suzanna Sherryhas extensively documented, " state
courts in the revolutionary era and thereafter had little doubt of their
power and authority to declare invalid acts of government which
were perceived as violating these fundamental principles of right and
justice. However, in most cases, the actual issues involved were
quite far afield from the concerns of "civil rights" as we understand
that term today, and even further removed from issues of equality or
affirmative action. Typical cases from this very early period would
involve such issues as the taking of property without compensation,
imposition of retroactive or ex post facto laws, or legislative
extinguishment of debts.0 3 Later cases from the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth century focus more upon prohibition of legislative
distinctions which struck the reviewing court as arbitrary or
otherwise unrelated to any legitimate police power concern."°'
Only in the last twenty years or so have there been any substantial
number of state court cases which have relied on these sorts of
"natural law/equal rights" provisions to address issues that can be
101. Ala. Const. art. I, § 1 (1901); Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (1879); Fla. Const. art.
1 § 2 (1968); Ky. Const. § 3 (1891). California also has a provision guaranteeing,
among other things, a federally derived right to "equal protection of the law." Cal.
Const. art. I, § 7. This latter provision has been amended to expressly prohibit
bussing of students for purposes of desegregation, except when specifically
required by federal law.
102. Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 173 (1992).
See also Williams supra note 97, at 1201-06.
103. Sherry, supra note 102, at 185-221, discussing cases from Virginia,
Massachusetts, New York, and South Carolina. See also, to similar effect, City of
Janesville v. Carpenter, 46 N.W. 128 (Wis. 1890) (local ordinance depriving owner
of beneficial use of his property); Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1 (Cal. 1857) (general
rule that a state cannot extinguish "vested rights").
104. Such cases were often phrased (and are today often dismissed because they
were phrased) in terms of "substantive due process." One variant of this line of
thinking involved a particular issue that is normally seen as related to civil rights,
that is, those cases which struck down "separate but equal" school systems in
certain northern states on the ground that such distinctions were neither authorized
by the state constitution nor "reasonable." See, e.g., Clark v. Bd. of Dir., 24 Iowa
266 (Iowa 1868); Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. 1849).
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easily classified as "civil rights" cases. Such cases are beginning to
crop up, however, in several contexts. For, example, several state
courts relied on state constitutional provisions of this type to depart
from prevailing federal law and strike down state restrictions on
funding for abortions. °5 Others have relied on similar language to
strike down state laws criminalizing consensual sodomy, particularly
when the law distinguishes between heterosexuals and
homosexuals.'06 And in one particularly relevant case, the Florida
Supreme Court held that a proposed state constitutional amendment
that would have outlawed affirmative action should not be placed on
the ballot, in part because the proposal failed to inform the voters that
such an amendment would affect the natural rights/equal rights
guarantee of the Florida Bill of Rights. 0 7 The clear implication was
that the state constitutional guarantee recognized the necessity of
race-conscious remedies in some sorts of cases.
So then, do these cases suggest that an independent state
constitutional analysis is on the way? The short answer,
unfortunately, is "not yet." Many of these cases seem to largely
follow federal equal protection analysis, differing from federal
precedent only in the result.'08 Others do differ from federal modes
of analysis in significant ways, but not necessarily in ways that would
give much comfort to proponents of a robust view of civil rights.
Thus in both Right to Choose v. Byrne"°9 (an abortion funding case)
and Kentucky v. Wasson"' (a sodomy case), the respective state
courts appeared to depart from federal "tier" analysis of equal
protection and rely instead on a more unitary, free form, "balancing"
approach. While this approach gave the New Jersey and Kentucky
courts some rationale for differing from federal analysis of similar
issues, the approach would seem susceptible of degenerating into the
kind of loose "equity" analysis that Professor White discerns and
decries in federal law. Perhaps a more hopeful sign is the decision of
the Connecticut court in Doe v. Maher"' (an abortion funding case).
105. See, e.g., Moe v. Sec. of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981);
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1991).
106. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealthv. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
107. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General, 778 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2000).
108. See, e.g., Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S. 2d 972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (striking
down an abortion funding ban on state due process and equal protection grounds,
but largely relying on Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions in Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2651 (1980)); Moe v. Sec. ofAdmin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d
387 (1981) (striking down abortion funding restrictions on due process grounds).
109. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
110. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
111. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986).
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Here, the court largely followed federal conceptual framework in
analyzing whether the state's decision to fund childbirth but not
abortions for the indigent violated the state's "natural rights"-type
equal protection guarantee. However, the Connecticut court showed
itself much more willing than is the federal Supreme Court to
consider the case in light of real world structural realities and
asymmetries, as it took explicit note of the actual coercive impact of
the state's choices on the life experiences of the poor."2
Nonetheless, however much one may welcome the outcomes and
some of the analytic moves made in these cases, the net is far from
any convincing independent state constitutional analysis of the basic
issues of equal protection and civil rights. The outcomes in these
cases have little grounding in the particular language or history of the
state constitutional provision at issue. Divergent outcomes can be
found in states with similar constitutional texts and histories, and
similar outcomes have been reached in states with very different texts
and histories. Moreover, even those courts which asserted most
powerfully the differences between federal and state constitutional
traditions have failed to connect up their present day analysis to any
in-state tradition of interpretation of these "natural law" texts, or to
any broader philosophic tradition regarding the meaning and
interpretation of natural law and natural rights. The hard work of
analyzing and expounding a natural law based notion of what "equal
rights" really means has yet to be done.
On the other hand it appears, at least preliminarily, that an
analysis of constitutional equality which authentically based a state
constitutional tradition of protection of natural rights could well
provide the basis for a truly different vision.
Three independent but related features of current federal analysis
that make it so difficult to achieve progressive results in civil rights
cases are: 1) the "individualist" focus of federal equal protection law,
which rejects equalization of outcomes across groups as a permissible
policy goal; 2) the definition of the core meaning of "equal
protection" in terms of "classification" rather than in terms of
"subordination;" and 3) the federal Supreme Court's insistence that
plaintiffs alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection must show "intent," a requirement
which makes it difficult for the federal courts to confront structural
issues that reinforce subordination. A state constitutional natural
rights-based analysis seems well suited to provide the foundation for
an alternate vision, at least to some extent. Older versions of natural
law analysis may be compatible with giving primacy to the moral and
legal claims of certain kinds of "groups" (e.g., family or community)
112. Id. at 146-157.
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over the claims of individuals. However, the language and
enlightenment intellectual roots of the state constitutional provisions
discussed above appear to contain a large bias toward individualist
analyses. On other hand, nothing in the natural law tradition
precludes an analysis that will avoid the other two characteristics of
current federal analysis identified above. On the contrary, starting
one's analysis with a base concept of the inherent dignity and worth
of each person-as these natural law theories seem to start-seems
perfectly compatible with a legal analysis of "equality" that takes as
its lodestar the need to create a world in which the outcomes of a
person's life will not correlate with their race, gender, or physical
condition.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, the decision in LAGC appears to
demonstrate that those who would try to use state courts and state
constitutions as a basis for articulating and exploring a different
vision of the meaning of equal protection-one that differs from that
which currently prevails on federal Supreme Court-are not likely to
succeed unless they can identify and articulate a truly independent
tradition, in their state, regarding what these concepts mean. In
Louisiana, such a tradition does not exist, except in weakest possible
form, and except for a brief period when legal protection of civil
rights was imposed from the outside, by military force. And as the
decision in LAGC shows, the chance of an independent voice from
the bayou is therefore correspondingly poor.
All is not bleak, however. Other states enjoy a more robust, well
rooted tradition regarding the meaning and interpretation of these
concepts. It appears that, in these states, the promise of a truly
different vision of civil rights remains viable.
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